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ESSAY

DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACT LAW

DURING THE

1980's: THE Top

TEN

E. Allan Farnsworth*
THERE IS A tyranny to the number ten. Surely it offends common sense to suppose that history can be neatly packaged in
decades, yet we commonly speak of the events of "the 50s" or of
"the 60s." And while it strains credulity to believe that excellence
can be conveniently identified by lists of ten, recurrent reference is
made to the "top ten" or the "ten best." Thus, in a year that
began with the likes of "the top ten news events of the 80s" and
"the ten best movies of the decade," it may not be amiss for an
observer of the changing scene in contract law to succumb to this
tyranny and pick the top ten developments in that field during the
1980s.
The most furious activity in contract law over the past decade
focused on the development, sometimes successful and sometimes
not, of theories expanding contractual liability. Three of the top
ten developments fall under this heading: bad faith breach,' atwill employment, 2 and precontractual negotiations and preliminary agreements. 3 Other areas which showed change include longterm contracts, 4 intimate contracts, 5 and the debate over formali* Alfred McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia University and Reporter, Restatement (Second)of Contracts. B.S., University of Michigan (1948); J.D., Columbia Univer-

sity (1952). This article is based on a lecture given as a Scholar in Residence at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law
I. See infra text accompanying notes
2. See infra text accompanying notes
3. See infra text accompanying notes
4. See infra text accompanying notes

on March 6, 1990.
11-25.
26-45.
46-60.
61-76.
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ties versus reliance;" each of these developments is remarkable for
its departure from the expected path. Conversely, the areas of the
relationship of contract to tort law, 7 unconscionability,8 and contract theory9 are conspicuous for failing to fulfill their anticipated
impact on contract law. Finally, the 1980s saw the internationalization of contract law - a legislative event that was the culmination of an effort spanning half a century.1"
1.

BAD FAITH BREACH

Perhaps the most astonishing development among the top ten
is the rise and fall of the doctrine of bad faith breach - though
both "rise" and "fall" involve some hyperbole. While courts typically are loath to award punitive damages for breach of contract,
they have at times been willing to do so where the breach involves
conduct that is "tortious" in some respect.' What better way for
courts to justify an award of punitive damages than to invent a
new tort: "bad faith breach of contract."
The first application of this tort came during the 1950s and
involved actions against insurers who refused to accept reasonable
settlements of third party claims. 2 During the 1970s the tort of
bad faith breach was extended to first-party cases where the

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra text accompanying notes 77-97.
See infra text accompanying notes 98-109.
See infra text accompanying notes 110-16.
See infra text accompanying notes 117-35.
See infra text accompanying notes 136-47.
See infra text accompanying notes 148-59.
11. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 875-79 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the evolution of bad faith breach).
12. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 660, 328 P.2d
198, 201 (1958) (insurer refused to defend insured or settle a claim against insured within
the policy limits, court held insurer liable for the entire amount of the judgment against
insured, even the amount in excess of the policy limits, if insurer "[was] guilty of bad faith
in refusing settlement."); Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 370, 228 S.W.2d
750, 753 (1950) (insurer who refuses in bad faith to settle a claim is liable to insured for
the amount of the judgment exceeding the policy limits); Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 668, 250 S.W.2d 785, 790 (1952) ("The courts seem to be
unanimous in holding an insurer liable in tort for an excess over the policy limit where as
here it has exclusive control over investigation and settlement of claims and its refusal to
settle within the policy limits is fraudulent or in bad faith."); Evans v. Continental Casualty Co., 40 Wash. 2d 614, 627, 245 P.2d 470, 478 (1952) (insurer liable for entire judgment in excess of policy limits where insurer rejected settlement offer in bad faith). See
generally Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibilityfor Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REv.
1136 (1954) (discussing insurer's duty of good faith and reasonable care in making settlement decisions).
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breach consisted of the insurer's unreasonable denial of benefits to
the insured.13
Not until 1984, however, was there a serious suggestion that
the tort of bad faith breach could extend beyond the insurance
context. In that year the California Supreme Court decided Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil Co.'4 in which a
would-be oil dealer claimed damages from an oil company that
had refused to honor a contractual obligation to supply the dealer
with oil.' 5 In dictum the court expanded the bad faith breach tort
to impose liability where a party to a contract "in addition to
breaching the contract,

. . .

seeks to shield itself from liability by

denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists."' The court declined to indicate whether and under
what circumstances a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in a commercial contract might give rise to an
action in tort but stated there had to be some "special relationship" such as that between insurer and insured.' The court observed further that there are similar relationships "deserving of
similar legal treatment"' 8 but neglected to enumerate them.
The suggestion that the tort of bad faith breach might apply
to noninsurance contracts that exhibit characteristics similar to insurance contracts spawned considerable discussion in the law reviews' 9 and substantial litigation in the California courts.20 In
1988, however, the California Supreme Court dealt a severe blow
to the extension of bad faith breach that it fostered only a few
years earlier by refusing to apply the Seaman's dictum to an em-

13.

See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038,

108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973) ("when the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the insured's claim, it is subject to liability in tort.").
14.

36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).

15.

Id. at 759-61, 686 P.2d at 1160-62, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356-58.

16.

Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.

17. Id. at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
18. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
19. See, e.g., Putz & Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attorney Fees - Not Tort
Liability - Is the Remedy for "Stone Walling," 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 419 (1987); Note,
Extending the Bad Faith Tort Doctrine to General Commercial Contracts,65 B.U.L. REv.
355 (1985); Comment, Formulating Standardsfor Awards of Punitive Damages in the
Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 2033 (1986); Note, Tort Remedies
for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and FairDealing into the CommercialRealm, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 377 (1986).
20. See, e.g., Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123
(1984) (employee who alleged that former employer abused its position of financial control

succeeded in pleading cause of action for tortious breach of contract).
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ployer's discharge of an employee. In Foley v. Interactive Data
Co.,2 the court objected to the "uncritical incorporation" by some
California decisions "of the insurance model into the employment
context, without careful consideration of the fundamental policies
underlying the development of tort and contract law in general or
of significant differences between the insurer/insured and employer/employee relationships. 22 The court concluded, "we are
not convinced that a 'special relationship' analogous to that between insurer and insured should be deemed to exist in the usual
employment relationship ....
Only a few states have followed Seaman's, 24 and it seems
likely that Foley will go far to check the spread of the doctrine of
bad faith breach during the 1990s.15 Nonetheless, the spectre of
bad faith breach promises to haunt contract law until future cases
determine its fate.
2.

THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE

If there was a development to rival the importance of bad
faith breach during the 1980s, it was the re-examination of the
employment at-will doctrine. Under this doctrine, either the employer or the employee may terminate the relationship unilaterally
at any time, for any lawful reason or for no reason at all.2 6 Breach
of contract claims made in the context of an at-will relationship
proved troublesome on two levels: the validity of the at-will doctrine itself and the modification of that relationship by representations made in an employment handbook.
First, such claims challenged the continuing vitality of the

21. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
22. Id. at 689, 765 P.2d at 393, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32.
23. Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 395, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
24. See, e.g., K-Mart Co. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987) (compensatory and
punitive damages awarded to employee in suit against employer who fired employee in
order to avoid paying retirement benefits). But see, e.g., Betterton v. First Interstate Bank,
800 F.2d 732, 736 (8th Cir. 1986) (in view "of the Arizona Supreme Court's demonstrated
antipathy towards extension of the bad faith tort beyond the insurance context, we conclude that any breach of the duty of good faith . . . would involve only contractual
remedies.").
25. See Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176, 187 (9th Cir. 1989)
("[T]he Foley court dramatically curtailed the expansion of bad faith liability beyond the
traditional insurer-insured relationship.").
26. E.g., Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 103, 483 N.E.2d 150,
153 (1985).
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employment at-will doctrine, or Wood's rule.17 Beginning in the

late 1970s and continuing into the 1980s discharged employees
were generally successful in establishing public policy exceptions
to Wood's rule.2 For instance, an employer is not free to discharge an employee if the reason for the discharge is that the'employee had informed the authorities of some illegal activity by the
employer. 29 Employees generally were not successful, however, in
replacing Wood's rule with one allowing an employer to discharge
an employee only for good cause or in good faith. 30 Attempts by
employees to establish such a limitation on an employer's ability
to act suffered a resounding defeat in California in 1988 when, in
Foley v. Interactive Data Co.,31 the state supreme court reversed
its field.32 The Foley court declined to extend the doctrine of bad
faith breach to the employer-employee relationship, reasoning that
"a breach in the employment context does not place the employee

27. The employment at-will doctrine was first enunciated in 1877 as a rule of evidence by Horace Grey Wood, who wrote:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden
is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or
year, or no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the
party may serve.
H.G. WOOD. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877). See
generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 7.17, at 557-59 (discussing Wood's rule and
cases attacking it). For a defense of Wood's rule, see Epstein, In Defense of the Contract
at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (examining the employment at-will doctrine in light
of intrinsic fairness, wealth enhancemerit, and distributional fairness).
28. E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 II1.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (employees
cannot be dismissed from employment because they have filed a worker's compensation
claim); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (plaintiff
cannot be discharged for refusing to violate a code of ethics); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and
Co., 298 Or. 76 689 P.2d 1292 (1984) (discharge for resisting sexual harassment held
wrongful).
29. See, e.g., Sheets V.Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385
(1980) (the court held that at-will employee who alleged that he had been dismissed in
retaliation for his insistence that his employer comply with requirements of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetics Act sufficiently alleged a cause of action in tort for wrongful
discharge).
30. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d
1025 (1985) (concluding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not
limit the employer to for cause terminations). But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2)
(1989) (a discharge is wrongful if it "was not for good cause.").
31. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
32. Prior to Foley, the California appellate courts had concluded that the employment relationship imposed a duty of good faith on employers. Consequently, employees
could only be discharged for cause. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Ill Cal. App.
3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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in the same economic dilemma that an insured faces when an insurer in bad faith refuses to pay a claim or to accept a settlement
offer within policy limits." ' 33 Thus, Wood's rule remains the principle governing most employment relationships although the 1980s
saw the establishment of some limited exceptions to this general
rule.
With Wood's rule intact, challenges to termination decisions
arose on a second front. Employees claimed that the at-will nature
of the employment relationship had been modified by an agreement between the employer and the employee. Generally, the
claim that the at-will employment relationship had been modified
was based on representations made in an employment handbook.34
To succeed in such a claim an employee must show that the
employer made such a representation. If the handbook containing
policies on termination was promulgated at the time the employee
began working for the employer, there is no difficulty in enforcing
these policies against the employer. 35 Even if representations bearing on the employment relationship are made at some later time,
it is still possible to show that such representations constitute a
modification of the employment at-will relationship. Here, the reasoning is that the employer makes an offer that the employee accepts by continued service and forbearance from accepting other
employment opportunities, thus satisfying the traditional elements
of contract formation.3 6 Furthermore, if the employer makes a
promise upon which the employee relies in continuing to work for
the employer, the traditional requirements of promissory estoppel
are satisfied.3 Some courts have gone even further, holding that

33. Foley, Cal. 3d at 692, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
34. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.15a (lawyer's ed. 1990).
35. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 614, 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980) (where employee is given a personnel manual when hired, the
manual "can give rise to contractual rights in the employees .... ").
36. See, e.g., Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 601, 440 N.E.2d
998, 1002-03 (1982) (employee's agreement to forego a more lucrative position in exchange for employer's promise of job security creates contract that alters the at-will nature
of the employment relationship).
37. E.g., Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
In Mers, the court held:
[T]he doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable and binding to oral at-will
employment agreements. . ..
The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether
the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the
employee.
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traditional contract rules do not apply in the employment context;
thus, it is unnecessary for an employee to prove knowledge of or
reliance upon the employer's offer. 8 In Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 9 for example, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that it is "unnecessary for [the employee] to prove reliance
on the policies set forth in the manual in order to prove an obligation on the part of the employer to follow those policies. ' 40 Such
decisions marked a radical departure from traditional contract law
and also produced the salutary result that all employees, those
who had read the handbook and those who had not, were treated
alike.
A second issue concerns the existence of consideration, or
some substitute such as reliance, for the employer's promise in the
handbook. 1 Again, if a handbook is made available when an employee is hired, or if it is furnished when an employee threatens to
quit, plainly there is consideration, or at least reliance, in the employee's subsequent service.42 If, however, the handbook is simply
distributed after the employment relationship is established, the
issue is less clear. In 1983 the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,43 held that "[t]he employee's
retention of employment constitutes acceptance of the offer of a
unilateral contract; by continuing to stay on the job, although free
to leave, the employee supplies the necessary consideration for the
offer." 44 By allowing an employee's continued service to constitute
consideration even though it is not in response to an employer's
promise, courts have departed from the traditional contract law
requirement that consideration be part of every bargain. 5

Id. at 105, 483 N.E.2d at 155.
38. Cf. Scwhartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 106 Mich. App. 471, 477-78, 308 N.W.2d
459, 462 (1981) (generally "an employer's conduct and other pertinent circumstances may
establish an unwritten 'common law' providing . . . a just cause termination policy,"
though particular employee's claim was based merely on his own subjective expectancy).
39. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
40. Id. at 613 & n.25, 292 N.W.2d at 892 & n.25.
41. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 2.9a (discussing the different
theories of consideration advanced by employees to support an employment contract).
42. See, e.g., Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d,596, 602-03, 440
N.E.2d 998, 1003-04 (1982) (where an employee foregoes another job offer in reliance
upon the employer's promise of permanent employment, that contract is supported by sufficient consideration and is enforceable).
43. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
44. Id. at 627.
45. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 2.2 (discussing the bargain theory of consideration).
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In the 1980s, then, the at-will employment cases pressed for
the expansion of liability in traditional contract law on three
fronts: Wood's rule itself, handbooks as offers or at least promises,
and consideration.
3.

PRECONTRACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS AND PRELIMINARY
AGREEMENTS

The 1980s saw a marked increase in claims based on precontractual negotiations and preliminary agreements,46 sparked in

good part by the spate of mergers and acquisitions that characterized the decade. A leading example of this trend is Texaco Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co.,47 one of the most celebrated, perhaps notorious,
cases of the decade.48 Pennzoil sued Texaco over the sale of Getty
Oil Company stock to Texaco by various Getty entities after
Pennzoil had agreed to purchase the same stock.49 Pennzoil first
attempted to sue Getty for breach of contract. When this foray
into the Delaware courts proved abortive,5" Pennzoil shifted its
46. For a general treatment of precontractual liability and preliminary agreements in
the context of negotiations, see Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217 (1987).
47. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1305 (1988).
48. For an in-depth analysis of the key figures involved in the various negotiations,
the negotiations themselves, and the resulting lawsuits, see T. PETZINGER, OIL & HONOR:
THE TEXACO-PENNZOIL WARS (1987).

49. Pennzoil first expressed an interest in acquiring the Getty Oil Company in late
December of 1983. At that time, Pennzoil announced an unsolicited public tender offer for
sixteen million shares of Getty Oil stock at $100 per share. Within days of this public offer,
Pennzoil contacted Gordon P. Getty, a director of Getty Oil, who was also the trustee of
the Sarah C. Getty Trust (the "Getty Trust") which held approximately 40.2% of the
outstanding shares in Getty Oil stock. In addition, Pennzoil contacted a representative of
the J. Paul Getty Museum (the "Getty Museum") which held 11.8% of the Getty Oil
stock. After a few days of negotiations, a Memorandum of Agreement was prepared which
outlined the terms of the sale of stock owned by the Getty Trust and Getty Museum to
Pennzoil. This Memorandum was later signed by the parties. The terms set forth in the
Memorandum were communicated to and rejected by the Getty Oil board of directors. A
revised Pennzoil offer was also rejected but evidence indicated that a counter-proposal by
Getty Oil was accepted by Pennzoil. Getty Oil and Pennzoil each announced through press
releases that the companies had reached "an agreement in principle" to merge. While the
attorneys were attempting to finalize a formal agreement between Getty Oil and Pennzoil,
Texaco approached the representative of the Getty Museum with a better offer for the
Museum's stock. The Museum representative accepted this offer and, later that day, Texaco met with Gordon Getty to discuss the sale of the Getty Trust stock. Getty accepted
Texaco's more lucrative offer and signed a letter of intent to sell the Trust stock to Texaco.
Subsequently, Texaco issued a press release stating that Texaco and Getty Oil would
merge. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d at 785-87.
50. Pennzoil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., No. 7425 (Civ.) (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 1984) (LEXIS).
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strategy to the Texas courts and sued Texaco there for tortious
interference with an alleged contract between Pennzoil and the
Getty stockholders. The resulting verdict totaled almost $11 billion and included an award of punitive damages amounting to $3
billion. The award was upheld by the Texas Court of Appeals
with a reduction in the amount of punitive damages to one billion.51 The Supreme Court of the United States subsequently refused to relieve Texaco of the burden of filing a supersedeas bond,
as required by Texas law in order to appeal, 52 causing Texaco to
file for bankruptcy. The Texas Supreme Court denied Texaco's
request for review, but Texaco was able to settle with Pennzoil for
three billion dollars, thereby allowing Texaco to emerge from
bankruptcy.
Viewing Pennzoil through the lens of a European civil law
system provides an interesting criticism of the American law and,
indeed, the common law. Had the transactions between Getty and
Pennzoil, and later Getty and Texaco, occurred in a European
civil law system, Pennzoil's recourse would have been against
Getty rather than Texaco. Pennzoil's action against Getty could
have been based either on breach of a preliminary agreement, as
in Pennzoil's claim against Texaco, or on breach of a court-imposed duty of good faith. 3 Damages for breach of the preliminary
agreement would include Pennzoil's full measure of lost expectation, but punitive damages could not have been awarded. Damages for breach of a court-imposed duty of good faith would have
been far more modest - Pennzoil's out of pocket expenses in negotiating and perhaps some allowance for lost opportunities. 4

51. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1305 (1988).

52. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
53.

See Farnsworth, supra note 46, at 239-42. "European courts have been more

willing than American ones to accept scholarly proposals for precontractual liability based
on a general obligation of fair dealing." Id. at 239. For example, in Germany damages are
awarded where a party to the contract "awakes in the other confidence in the imminent

coming into existence of a contract." Id. at 240 (citation omitted). Similarly, the courts in
France impose precontractual liability under a tort theory where a party breaks off negotiations unjustifiably or where the party had no intention of contracting. Id. at 241.
54. See id. at 223-29. These damages appropriately represent the injured party's reliance interest. Reliance damages are intended to restore the injured party to the position it
would have been in had the negotiations not taken place. Lost opportunities are arguably a
proper component of the reliance measure if the plaintiff can prove the value of these

opportunities with reasonable certainty. Id. at 225. For a European perspective on the case,
see Draetta, The Pennzoil Case and the Binding Effect of the Letters Intent [sic] in the
International Trade Practice, 1988 REVUE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRS INTERNATIONALES 155.
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Thus, it would have been possible to give Pennzoil adequate relief
without going to the extreme of the actual verdict upheld by the

Texas courts. Under the common law's all-or-nothing approach,
there was no such middle ground.
In 1989, as the decade drew to a close, the Second Circuit
decided a case that further illustrates this all-or-nothing aspect of

the common law system. In Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp.,55 the prospective purchaser of a fertilizer business
sued the prospective seller for breach of a preliminary agreement. 6 The court, unlike the Pennzoil court, held the agreement

unenforceable as a contract to sell the business, but remanded for
consideration of the possibility that the language of the agreement

amounted to a promise to negotiate in good faith on which the
prospective purchaser had relied.57 If the prospective purchaser
was successful in demonstrating promissory estoppel, the purchaser would be entitled to compensation in the amount of its reliance interest, but not its full expectation interest.5 8
Pennzoil and Arcadian Phosphates demonstrate the importance of the enforceability of preliminary agreements. Absent
such a preliminary agreement as that present in Pennzoil, the
court will not protect the disappointed party's lost expectation.
Absent a preliminary agreement such as that found in Arcadian
Phosphates the court will not even impose a duty of good faith. 9
Liability arising out of precontractual negotiations and the
enforceability of preliminary agreements are clearly issues that
will not be confined to the decade of the 1980s.60

55. 884 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1989).
56. The preliminary agreement specified the purchase price of the business, the timing and amount of the payments, the assets to be purchased, and a closing date. The agreement also included the "framework" for further negotiations for the purchase of the seller's
finished product. This agreement was subject to the approval of both companies' boards,
but some terms were not wholly specified, such as what participants would be allowed to
take part in the joint venture and the method of payment. The agreement also included a
statement indicating the parties' intention to "cooperate fully and work judiciously in order
to expedite the closing date and consummate the sale of the business." Id. at 70-71.
57. Id. at 72-73.
58. Id.
59. "It is not easy to justify the refusal of [American] courts to recognize a duty of
fair dealing under an agreement to negotiate when they have been willing to recognize such
a duty either under an ultimate agreement or an agreement with open terms." Farnsworth,
supra note 46, at 268.
60. The pace of this development may be quickened if there should develop an
awareness of the possibility of a more general ground for relief along with a general dissatisfaction with the common law remedies of restitution and damages based on reliance or
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4.

LONG-TERM CONTRACTS

While expanded liability concerns followed a fairly predictable direction, other issues in contract law deviated from their expected path. Problems relating to long-term contracts came to the
fore with the energy crisis of 1973, when suppliers sought to be
excused from their obligations under long-term requirements contracts on the ground of commercial impracticability. 1 A case
which exemplifies the difficulty in reforming long-term contracts is
the noted dispute between Westinghouse and the utility companies
to which Westinghouse had agreed to supply a large amount of
uranium. 62 Westinghouse attempted to terminate the long-term
supply contracts, claiming that a three-fold increase in the price
of uranium made fulfillment of the agreements commercially impracticable.6 Litigation ensued, but this dispute failed to produce
64
a definitive, reported opinion, and thus further clouded the issue.
One of the most controversial cases concerning long-term
contracts appeared at the start of the 1980s: Aluminum Co. of
America v. Essex Group, Inc."" Under a sixteen year contract
which was renewable for an additional five year term, the Aluminum Company of America ("ALCOA") was to receive alumina
from Essex Group, convert it into molten aluminum, and return it
to Essex for further processing. The contract contained a price
escalation clause, devised when the contract was made in 1967,
based in part on the Wholesale Price Index for Industrial Commodities ("WPI").66 By 1979 it had become evident that the WPI

specific promises. Farnsworth, supra note 46, at 242.
61. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 437-42
(S.D. Fla. 1975) (Gulf and Eastern entered into a requirements contract whereby Gulf
agreed to supply all of Eastern's requirements for jet fuel at certain airports. Gulf contended that this requirements contract had become commercially impracticable due to increased fuel costs, but failed to show the extent of expected losses from performing the
contract and thus failed to prove the defense of impracticability).
62. Jennings, Commercial Impracticability-DoesIt Really Exist?, 2 WHITTIER L.
REV. 241, 251-52 (1980).

63. See generally id. at 251-56 (discussing the application of U.C.C. § 2-615 to the
Westinghouse case).
64. See Eagan, The Westinghouse Uranium Contracts: Commercial Impracticability
and Related Matters, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 281, 298 (1980) (describing the Westinghouse litigation, the author commented, "[r]arely have judges worked so diligently to avoid handing
down decisions ....
).
65. 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
66. Under the price escalation formula, $.03 per pound of the original price was to
escalate with the WPI and S.03 per pound was to escalate with an index based on the wage
rates paid to ALCOA employees. Only the portion of the formula based on the WPI was at
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was not keeping pace with the sharp rise in the cost of energy to
ALCOA, and the company stood to lose $60 million over the balance of the contract term. 7 ALCOA sought relief on the ground
of mutual mistake. The district court judge concluded that the
parties had chosen the WPI to reflect changes in ALCOA's nonlabor costs after a careful investigation by both parties showed
that the WPI had for some years tracked fluctuations in those
costs without marked deviations. 68 In doing so, the judge concluded, the parties had made an error "of fact rather than one of
simple prediction of future events." 69 Instead of allowing the usual
remedy of avoidance and rescission for mutual mistake, however,
the judge reformed the contract by modifying the price clause to
"yield Essex the benefit of its favorable bargain," but "reduce
ALCOA's disappointment to the limit of risk the parties expected
in making the contract." 70 Although the case was the subject of
scholarly commentary,7" it had a negligible impact on the development of contract law during the 1980s.
This development was unexpectedly stunted during the 1980s.
As the decade progressed, energy prices fluctuated and buyers, as

issue in the case. Id. at 56.
67. Id. at 73. The failure of the WPI escalation provision was explained as follows:
Beginning in 1973, OPEC actions to increase oil prices and unanticipated pollution control costs greatly increased ALCOA's electricity costs. Electrical power
is the principal non-labor cost factor in aluminum conversion, and the electric
power rates rose much more rapidly than did the [WPI]. As a result, ALCOA's
production costs rose greatly and unforeseeably beyond the indexed increase in
the contract price.
Id. at 58.
68. Id. at 63.
69. Id.
70. 499 F. Supp. at 80. The judge decided that granting rescission would give AlCOA a windfall gain in the inflated aluminum market and deny Essex the assured long
term aluminum supply and "gains it legitimately may enforce within the scope of the risk
ALCOA bears under the contract." Id. at 79.
71. See, e.g., Dawson, Judicial Revision of FrustratedContracts: The United States,
64 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1984) (criticizing the ALCOA decision and concluding that judges
should refrain from "rewriting the contracts of other people."); Speidel, The New Spirit of
Contract, 2 J.L. & CoM. 193 (1982) (discussing the new spirit of contract law, as opposed
to the classical model, concluding "that the 'new' spirit of contract is a form of tort - a
duty of good faith in performance and enforcement of a contract imposed without the
parties' consent."); Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply
Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 369 (1981) (concluding that a duty to bargain should be
imposed when unanticipated changes during the performance.of a long-term contract cause
substantial unbargained for gains and losses, that judicial intervention should be limited to
those cases when the bargaining fails, and that the ALCOA court's intervention was inappropriately premature.).
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well as sellers, became victims of their long-term contracts. A
flood of cases arose out of take-or-pay contracts in the natural gas
industry, in which pipeline companies sought relief from long-term
contracts to purchase natural gas that required the pipelines to
pay for gas even if they did not take any. 2 Pipelines suffered
great losses under these contracts when gas prices dropped. Courts
generally showed little sympathy for pipelines that found themselves in this situation. The Tenth Circuit stated in 1985 that a
buyer under a take-or-pay contract "can perform in either of two
ways. It can either (1) take the minimum purchase obligation of
natural gas (and pay) or (2) pay the minimum bill. .

.

. [T]he

impracticability of one alternative does not excuse the promisor
"'73

This toughening judicial attitude toward excuse based on
changed circumstances is epitomized by Northern Indiana Public
Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co. 4 This case involved a
contract, containing a price escalation clause, under which Northern Indiana Public Service Company ("NIPSCO") had agreed to
buy 1.5 million tons of coal per year for twenty years from Carbon County Coal Company ("Carbon"). When -it became cheaper
to buy electricity from neighboring utilities than to produce it internally, the Indiana Public Service Commission ordered NIPSCO
to buy electricity from other utilities at the lower rate. Because
NIPSCO did not expect to be allowed to recover the cost of buying coal from Carbon in its electrical rates, NIPSCO refused delivery from Carbon and sought a declaration that it was excused
from its contractual obligations to Carbon.75 NIPSCO was unsuccessful in obtaining the declaration. As Judge Richard Posner of
the Seventh Circuit expressed it:
[A] fixed-price contract is an explicit assignment of the risk of
market price increases to the seller and the risk of market price
decreases to the buyer, and the assignment of the latter risk to

72. See generally Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, Take or Litigate: Enforcing the
Plain Meaning of the Take-or-Pay Clause in NaturalGas Contracts,40 ARK. L. REV. 185
(1986) (estimating the number of cases arising from take-or-pay agreements at over one
hundred and analyzing litigation strategies for both buyers and sellers).
73. International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879, 885 (10th
Cir. 1985) (purchaser was forced to change its operations, which lowered its need for natural gas, in order to comply with intervening environmental regulations. The court found
that this prevented the purchaser from taking the gas, but not from paying for it).
74. 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
75. Id. at 267-68.
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the buyer is even clearer where, as in this case, 7the contract
places a floor under price but allows for escalation. 1
Thus, although not all courts turned a deaf ear to arguments
based on changed circumstances or impracticability, the "new
spirit of coniract," as expressed in ALCOA, failed to win the day.
5.

INTIMATE CONTRACTS

Long-term contracts was not the only area of contract law
that took an interesting turn during the 1980s. The field of intimate contracts, which encompasses agreements made within family and other intimate relationships, also held some surprises.
The 1970s saw a wave of cases upholding prenuptial agreements despite precedent that held such agreements unenforceable
as unreasonably impairing an essential incident of marriage, the
duty of support that the husband owes the wife. 8 In Posner v.
Posner,79 an influential case from 1972, the Florida Supreme
Court ruled that "inadequate and disproportionate provision for
the wife . . .will not vitiate an antenuptial agreement." 80 This
trend toward freedom of contract in the area of prenuptial agreements continued during the 1980s and was formalized by the promulgation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act in 1983.
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act allows the parties entering into a prenuptial agreement to contract with respect "to the
modification or elimination of spousal support"8 1 as well as "any
other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not
in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal
penalty." 2
During the 1970s, courts were confronted with the legal difficulties raised by agreements made between people who chose to
live together without marrying.8 3 These "cohabitation contracts"
76. Id. at 278.
77. For a more complete discussion of this area, see E.

FARNSWORTH,

supra note 11,

5.4.
78. E.g., Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961) (antenuptial
agreement which relieves the husband from the duty of supporting his wife is against public policy and therefore null and void).
79. 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972).
80. Id. at 534. However, such an agreement will not be enforced if one of the parties
fails to "'exercise a high degree of good faith and candor bearing upon the contract.'" Id.
at 535 (quoting DelVecchio v. DelVecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. 1962)).
81. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(4), 9B U.L.A. 371, 373 (1983).
82. Id. at § 3(a)(8), 9B U.L.A. at 373.
83. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 5.4, at 366.
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were frowned upon by courts as "immoral and a threat to the institution of marriage" 84 and, by implication, a threat to the interests of the state. 85 In 1976, however, the California Supreme
Court's decision in Marvin v. Marvin8" broke with this judicial
inclination. The court upheld a contract between Lee Marvin, the
movie actor, and Michelle Marvin, a former entertainer. The
couple lived together for seven years .and agreed to hold themselves out as husband and wife. In return for rendering services
''as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook," Michelle
Marvin was to "share equally any and all property accumulated
as a result of their efforts whether individual or combined. 87 Noting the "substantial increase in the number of couples living together without marrying,"88 the court concluded that "a contract
between nonmarital partners is unenforceable only to the extent
that it explicitly rests upon the immoral and illicit consideration
of meretricious sexual services. '"89

Although the Marvin case has not found universal favor, 90 it

had a substantial impact in other jurisdictions in the 1970s"9 and

this continued in the 1980s.12 As with prenuptial agreements, cohabitation contracts reinforced the idea that freedom of contract
should prevail over traditional moral restraints. Indeed, as two
perceptive observers wrote, "this approach gives cohabitants more
freedom in structuring their relationships than that given spouses,
since there are significant limitations upon the permissible scope
of marital contracts.""3
84. Id.
2d 49, 58, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207-08 (1979) (the
85. E.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 I11.
"impact" of the recognition of legal rights of people living together outside of the marital
relationship may "weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based society.").
86. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
87. Id. at 666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
88. Id. at 665, 557 P.2d at 109, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
89. Id. at 669, 557 P.2d at 112, 134 ChI. Rptr. at 819 (emphasis in original).
2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979) (the decision
90. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 I11.
to grant legal status to private agreements that substitute for the institution of marriage is
better left to the legislature).
91. See, e.g., Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 1977) (adopting the
Marvin court's resolution to enforce cohabitation agreements and its "guiding principles for
dealing with claims of property rights arising out of non-marital relationship.").
92. E.g., Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 341, 521 A.2d 142, 146 (1987) (citations omitted) ("[T]he decided trend among commentators and courts that have found an
agreement between unmarried cohabitants is to endorse the enforcement of such
agreement.").
93. Oldham & Caudill, A Reconnaissance of Public Policy Restrictions upon Enforcement of Contracts Between Cohabitants, 18 FAM. L.Q. 93, 140 (1984).
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In the 1980s, however, the judicial trend toward endorsing
freedom of contract in the context of intimate relationships was
abruptly halted in the face of moral outrage over one of the most
famous intimate contract cases of the decade. In In re Baby M, 4
the New Jersey Supreme Court held a surrogate parenting agreement unenforceable. The court concluded that the "contract's basic premise, that the natural parents can decide in advance of
birth which one is to have custody of the child, bears no relationship to the settled law that the child's best interests shall determine custody."9' 5 Much has been written on the Baby M case and
the New Jersey Supreme Court's response to surrogate mother-

hood, most of it approving. 6 In addition, a number of states have
enacted statutes making such contracts unenforceable."7
Thus, the 1980s witnessed a sharp limitation on party autonomy in one area of intimate contracts, specifically surrogacy contracts. This limitation reversing the trend of the 1970s toward
freedom to make intimate contracts was something of an anomaly
in a decade characterized by deregulation.
6.

FORMALITIES VERSUS RELIANCE

The third example of theoretical turnabout occurred in the
tug of war between formalities and reliance. In contract law, a
perennial tension between these two legal concepts, gives rise to

interesting issues concerning the enforceability of promises.
Should the mere utterance of a promise, supported by what

94. 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
95. Id. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246.
96. See, e.g., Areen, Baby M Reconsidered, 76 GEo. L.J. 1741, 1754 (1988) (arguing
that a contract such as the one in Baby M violates public policy because it "commercializes
[a] relationship previously based on personal intimacy, and ... place[s] . . .children and
poor women at risk in the future."); Wagner, The ContractualReallocation of Procreative
Resources and ParentalRights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 1 (1990). But see Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 326-337
(1988) (a contract to act as a surrogate promotes ideas such as convenient child-bearing
which detract from the conventional parent-child relationship). For further discussion of
the arguments for and against the enforcement of surrogacy agreements, see M. FIELD,
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988).
97. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-8-2-2 (1979) (surrogate agreements are void); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (1979) ("A surrogate parentage contract is void and unenforceable
as contrary to public policy."). But see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-l0-201(c)(1) (1989)
(the child is that of the "woman intended to be mother."); NEV.REV. STAT. § 127.287(5)
(1989) (statute prohibiting baby-selling inapplicable where there is a "lawful contract to
act as a surrogate.").
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Holmes suggested was the formality of consideration,9" be sufficient to bind the promisor, or should some reliance by the promisee be required? If the law requires some formality, such as a
writing, to render a promise enforceable, should that formality be
dispensed with if the promisee detrimentally relies upon the
promise?
The 1970s saw a significant judicial erosion of the requirement of a writing imposed by Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201,
the statute of frauds for the sale of goods.9" Courts were confronted with a rash of grain cases that grew out of sharp price
increases in 1973 and 1974. Farmers who made oral contracts to
sell to grain elevators reneged on their contracts using the statute
of frauds as a defense. The grain elevators claimed that they had
relied on the farmers' promises by making resale contracts and
that the farmers were therefore precluded from relying on the
statute of frauds to avoid enforcement of the contracts. Although
some courts adhered to the traditional position that such reliance
did not make the farmers' oral promises enforceable,' 0 other
courts accepted the argument of the grain elevators and enforced
the farmers' oral promises. 101
The expansion of the role of reliance, and the simultaneous
erosion of the role of formalities, did not continue in the 1980s.
Indeed, with the notable but single exception of the somewhat
confused Seventh Circuit case of Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters,102 the trend appears to be in the other

98. See Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass. 454, 456, 28 N.E. 578, 578 (1891) ("consideration is as much a form as a seal.").
99. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 6.12, at 455-59 (reviewing the
case law that has eroded the requirement of a writing set forth in U.C.C. § 2-201).
100. See, e.g., Farmland Serv. Coop. v. Klein, 196 Neb. 538, 542, 244 N.W.2d 86,
89 (1976) (reviewing summary judgment in favor of the reneging seller, the court succinctly analyzed the case: "The sale was for much more than $500. It was not in writing

....
It was not within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 2-201(3), U.C.C.
[Therefore], the trial court properly sustained the [defendant farmer's] motion for summary judgment.").
101.

E.g., Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979)

(recognizing promissory estoppel as a means of circumventing the statute of frauds);
Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736, 738 (N.D. 1976) ("promissory estoppel may act as a bar to the raising of the statute of frauds as a defense in oral

agreements for the sale of goods.").
102.

781 F.2d 1280, 1286-87 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that an oral modification of a

contract which includes a clause precluding such modification complying with U.C.C. § 2209(2) operates as a waiver under U.C.C. § 2-209(4) if there is reliance on the attempted

modification).
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direction.
On the judicial front, consider Voest-Alpine International
Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank.10 3 This case arose when Chase
Manhattan Bank agreed to confirm a letter of credit issued by a
foreign bank. Chase Manhattan informed a beneficiary of the letter of credit that it would pay the credit despite the fact that the
beneficiary's documentation did not conform to the requirements
of the letter of credit. 0 4 The beneficiary argued that the bank
waived its right to demand strict compliance with the letter of
credit, while the bank argued that it could not have waived incurable defects in the beneficiary's documentation. The court held
that "waiver

. .

.is defined as the intentional relinquishment of a

known right," and that the incurability of the defects is irrelevant
to a waiver. 0 5 There was no requirement that the beneficiary
prove it relied on the bank's waiver in order to collect on the letter
of credit. Rather, the court held that a mere declaration, a formality of sorts, suffices even in the absence of reliance. The VoestAlpine court's disregard for reliance is inconsistent with Wisconsin Knife, in which the court imposed a reliance requirement
where none was mandated by U.C.C. § 2-209(4),116 and demonstrates the trend favoring formality over reliance.
On the legislative front, law makers placed even greater emphasis on formalities than did judges. In 1980 the Minnesota legislature mandated that a cohabitation agreement concerning property or finances be "written" in order to be enforceable. 10 7 The
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, promulgated in 1983, likewise requires that a premarital agreement "be in writing and
signed by both parties."' 08 In 1987 the California Supreme Court

103. 707 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1983).
104. The court explained the requirement of strict compliance under a letter of
credit:
[T]he doctrine of strict compliance with the terms of the letter of credit functions to protect the bank which carries the absolute obligation to pay the beneficiary . . . .Literal compliance with the credit . . . is . .,. essential so as not to
impose an obligation upon the bank that it did not undertake and so as not to
jeopardize the bank's right to indemnity from its customer.
Id. at 683-82

105.

Id. at 685.

106.

See 781 F.2d at 1286-87. U.C.C. §2-209(4) provides that an oral modification

that is not in writing as required by U.C.C. § 2-209(2), (3) can operate as a waiver.
U.C.C. § 2-209(4) does not, on its face, require reliance by the party seeking to enforce the
oral modification. U.C.C. § 2-209(4) (1989).

107.
108.

MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (1989).
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT

§ 2, 9B U.L.A. 371, 372 (1983).
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took note of this trend, stating that "legislative preference for
written contracts is stronger than ever before."' 0 9 Thus the continuing appeal of formalities during the 1980s, despite the contrary
movement in the 1970s, constitutes the third surprising twist.
7.

RELATIONSHIP OF CONTRACT AND TORT

The 1980s were also remarkable for the developments which
did not take place. For example, Grant Gilmore made one of the
more celebrated predictions of the 1970s in The Death of
Contract:
[W]e might say that what is happening is that "contract"
is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of "tort." Until
the general theory of contract was hurriedly run up late in
the nineteenth century, tort had always been our residual
category of civil liability. As the contract rules dissolve, it
is becoming so again."'
Gilmore maintained that the facade of classical contract theory crumbled with the emergence of ideas such as unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel to supplement, and eventually supplant, bargain theory."' He further stated that these
developments, as well as the similarity between tort and contract
damages, leave no "viable distinction between liability in contract
' 2
and liability in tort."" 1
The 1980s, however, did not witness the death of contract.
Academic attempts to merge contracts into torts in courses called
"contorts" failed to flourish and it may be argued that contracts,
through liberal application of third party beneficiary doctrine, invaded the domain of tort during the 1980s. For example, a woman
to whom a testator intended to leave the bulk of his estate under
his will recovered damages for breach of contract from the lawyer
whose negligence in having the woman witness the will resulted in

109. Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., Inc., 43 Cal. 3d 1247, 1265, 743 P.2d 1279, 1289,
241 Cal. Rptr. 22, 32 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1011, reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1243

(1988). The court went on to list many types of consumer contracts that are required to be
in writing in California, including home improvement contracts in excess of $500, mobile
home sales, prepaid rental listing services, home solicitation contracts, automotive repairs,

dance studio lessons, health studio services, discount buying services, funeral services, and
attorney fee contracts. Id. at 1265-66, 743 P.2d at 1289, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
110. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1974).
11. Id.
112. Id. at 88.
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her taking nothing under it."x3 Similarly, a tenant who sustained
injuries in a fall on a dark walkway recovered damages for breach
of contract from the power company that had contracted with the
landlord to install and maintain outdoor lights." 4
Indeed, as early as the 1981 Association of American Law
Schools conference, Justice Abramson of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reported that contracts was "viable as a litigation category"
and that Gilmore's report of the death of contract was highly exaggerated." 5 At the same conference, Gilmore himself attempted
to provide "an explanation of why this field of law, which somebody or other said was dead, some time ago, is not only alive and
well but bursting at the seams."" 6
8.

UNCONSCIONABILITY AND RELATED DOCTRINES

Another arrested development in contract law concerned unconscionability and related doctrines. The 1970s were undeniably
the decade of the consumer in contract law. In 1975 Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Act to provide minimum disclosure
standards for written consumer product warranties, and to define
minimum content standards for those warranties." 7 During the

113. Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983). The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania justified its reliance on contract law in enforcing the intended beneficiary's
claim by pointing out that arguments supporting negligence analysis are:
based on a common confusion of negligence doctrines relating to standard of
care with those relating to scope of the risk, i.e., the class of persons to whom a
duty is owed, analyzed in negligence in terms of foreseeability. Thus, although a
plaintiff on a third party beneficiary theory in contract may in some cases have
to show a deviation from the standard of care . . . to establish a breach, the
class of persons to whom the defendant may be liable is restricted by principles
of contract law ....
Id. at 62, 459 A.2d at 752. The class of potential plaintiffs is limited by the contract
principle found in section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, restricting the
ability to sue to intended beneficiaries. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302
(1979). In Guy, the intended beneficiary was easy to identify because she was named in the
will. Guy, 501 Pa. at 61, 459 A.2d at 751-52.
114. Vick v. H.S.I. Mgmt. Inc., 507 So. 2d 433 (Ala. 1987). Unlike the plaintiff in
Guy, the plaintiff in Vick was not specifically mentioned as a beneficiary in the contract
between the defendant power company and the landlord. The Supreme Court of Alabama,
however, imposed a duty on the defendant under the contract because the defendant knew
that the tenants of the building were relying upon proper performance of the contract to
install lights. Id. at 436.
115. Kelso, The 1981 Conference on Teaching Contracts: A Summary and Appraisal, 32 J.LEGAL EDUC. 616, 616 (1982).
116. Id. at 640.
117. The Magnuson-Moss Act was enacted as Title I of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat.
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1970s state legislatures also enacted consumer protection statutes."1 8 Ohio presaged this trend, adopting its Deceptive Trade
Practices Act just before the decade began in 1969.119

Coinciding with these legislative developments, courts explored the impact of the doctrine of unconscionability. In 1973,
for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Shell Oil
Co. v. Marinello.'2" This decision extended the protection of the
doctrine of unconscionability to a gas station operator's lease and
dealership agreement. The lease and dealership agreement between the parties granted Shell the right to terminate the lease by
giving thirty days notice and to terminate the dealership agreement by giving ten days notice. Good cause for such termination
was not required in either event.' 21 Initially, the court found that
"Shell [was] the dominant party and that the relationship
[lacked] equality in the respective bargaining positions of the parties.' 22 Under these circumstances, the court held that the clause
granting Shell the unilateral right to terminate the agreement was
the "grossly unfair

. . .

result of Shell's disproportionate bargain-

ing position and," thus void as against public policy. 12 3
During the 1980s, the pendulum swung in the opposite direction. Some courts validated "due-on-sale" clauses in mortgages. 124
These clauses enabled the mortgagee to declare the remaining balance due immediately if the mortgagor sold the property, thus
preventing the mortgagor from allowing the purchaser to assume
a mortgage with a favorable interest rate. Many cases were generated by challenges to the validity of such clauses, though not all
were based on claims of unconscionability.125 Federal law now
governs the matter through the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which precludes such challenges. 26 Follow2183 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988)).

118. See, e.g., Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act,
501.201-501.213 (1988) (enacted in 1973).
119. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4165.01-4165.04 (Anderson 1980).
120.

FLA. STAT.

§§

63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974).

121. Id. at 405, 307 A.2d at 600.
122. Id. at 408, 307 A.2d at 601.
123. Id. at 409, 307 A.2d at 602.
124. See, e.g., Martin v. Peoples Mut. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa
1982) (upholding the validity of a due-on-sale clause).

125. See generally Jennings, The "Due-on-Sale" Bail-outfor MortgageLenders: An
Analysis of its Economic and Legal Soundness, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1151, 1154-55 (1986)

(discussing clauses limiting remedies and attacks on these clauses by buyers).
126.

12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(b) (1982) ("Notwithstanding any provision of the constitu-

tion or laws (including judicial decisions) of any State to the contrary, a lender may...
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ing the trend disfavoring the unconscionability defense, the South

Dakota legislature explicitly overruled a decision by that state's
Supreme Court upholding a farmer's challenge to a limitation of
warranty and remedy clause in a contract for the sale of seed
corn.

127

The most active area for litigation over claims of unfair contract terms, however, did not involve consumers. Rather, commercial buyers of manufactured goods often chafed under sellers' insistence on inserting clauses limiting buyers' remedies to repair
and replacement and precluding the recovery of consequential
damages.' 2 This "belt and suspenders" approach by sellers elicited a one-two punch from buyers.
Buyers began by arguing that if a seller's breach could not be
cured, the repair and replacement remedy "failed of its essential
purpose" under Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719(2).12

Deci-

sions addressing this argument began to appear in the 1970s,
often in the federal courts on diversity grounds. In an early and
influential case, the Fifth Circuit granted relief from such a
clause, commenting that a "seller does not have an unlimited time
for the performance of the obligation to replace and repair
parts."''

0

Having gained a foothold in their fight against the sellers,
buyers then argued that the bar to recovery of consequential dam-

ages was so intimately connected with the repair and replacement
provision, that when the latter failed of its essential purpose, the
former fell as part of the same house of cards. In an early decision

enter into or enforce a contract containing a due-on-sale clause with respect to a real property loan."). See generally Jennings, supra note 125, at 1157-74 (analyzing the effects of
enforcing due-on-sale clauses under the Garn-St. Germain Act).
127. In Hanson v. Funk Seeds Int'l, 373 N.W.2d 30 (S.D. 1985), the Supreme Court
of South Dakota upheld a trial court finding that a limitation of warranty and remedy
clause was unconscionable because of the unequal bargaining power between a seed manufacturer and a farmer. In 1986 the South Dakota Legislature passed a law which abro-

gated the decision in Hanson. S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

§ 57A-2-316 (1988) (permitting

exclusion or modification of warranties); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-719 (1988)
(permitting contractual modification or limitation of remedy).
128. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 4.28, at 335-37.
129. Section 2-719(2) provides that "where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose" other remedies provided by the Code are available. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1989). For a discussion of this argument, see E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 11, § 4.28, at 336-37.
130. Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670, 673 n.5 (5th Cir. 1971) (action against
automobile manufacturer by purchaser for breach of warranty and for negligent repair of
defects).
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that accepted this argument, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
"failure of essential purpose makes available all contractual remedies, including consequential damages," despite the limitation
clause.131
During the 1980s, however, the house of cards argument
fared badly In Chatlos Systems v National Cash Register
Corp., 32 the Third Circuit declared that the "better reasoned approach is to treat the consequential damage disclaimer as an independent provision, valid unless unconscionable."'1 33 Many cases
34
followed Chatlos,1
and even those that did not concluded that
the matter should be decided by interpreting each contract on a
case-by-case basis.13 5
In sum, continued expansion of unconscionability and related
doctrines did not occur in the 1980s as expected. Furthermore, the
major push for expansion came in connection with commercial,
rather than consumer, transactions. Regardless, the push was, on
the whole, noteworthy mainly for its lack of success.
9

CONTRACT THEORY

Viewed from academe, the most significant non-event of the
decade was the failure of contract theory to have a significant impact in practice. In 1981, at the start of the decade, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts appeared. It was the epitome of the
traditional conception of contracts - at least as that conception
appeared to the establishment as represented by the American
Law Institute. Robert Braucher, my predecessor as Reporter,
claimed that "[t]he effort to restate the law of contracts in modern terms highlights the resilience of private autonomy in an era
of expanding government activity
Freedom of contract, refined and redefined in response to social change, has power as it

131. Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Freuhauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1977).
132. 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982).
133. Id. at 1086 (footnote omitted).
134. See, e.g., Kaplan v. RCA Corp., 783 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that
failure of the repair and replacement warranty does not automatically invalidate a limit on
consequential damages); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 107 N.J. 584,
596-99, 527 A.2d 429, 435-37 (1987) (explicitly adopting the approach of Chatlos and
rejecting that of Soo Line).
135. E.g., Fiorito Bros. v. Freuhauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1984)
(reasoning that the question of whether the limit on consequential damages is separable
from the repair and replace clause depends on the intent of the parties in each case).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:203

always had."'3 8 But others viewed the new Restatement and the
traditional body of contracts scholarship that it represented with
less enthusiasm.
During the 1970s scholars lamented what they believed to be
the demise of contract law as its own distinct area. In 1974 Grant
Gilmore proclaimed The Death of Contract,137 while later, in
1979, Patrick Atiyah echoed similar sentiments in his book The
Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract.138 Other commentators
were not so quick to forecast the end of contract law, but merely
complained of its developmental stagnation. In 1978 Ian Macneil
denigrated the traditional view of contract law as "neoclassical," a
body of inflexible law "epitomized by the U.C.C. Art[icle] 2 and
[the tentative drafts of the] Restatement (Second) of Contracts"
and founded on the system "developed in the 19th century and
brought to its pinnacle by Samuel Williston," though "considerably modified in some of its detail."'' 3 9 Other writers, associated
with the critical legal studies movement were even less charitable.
Roberto Unger, one of the cardinals of critical legal studies, declared that "the modern law of contract . . . is hostile to personal
authority as a source of order; it preaches equality in distrust. The
mechanisms of egalitarian, self-interested bargaining and adjudication cannot be made to jibe with the illiberal blend of power
and allegiance."' 40
During this attack on the substance of contract law, many
contracts scholars attempted to breathe new life into contract law
by integrating principles of other disciplines. Some scholars explored the historical foundations of contract law' 4 ' while others

136. Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE Li.
598, 615-16 (1969).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.
138. P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979). Atiyah
attributes the decline of contract in England to the waning role of the individual in the
allocation of resources and the concomitant increase in Government regulation and involvement in the economy, a shift from the notion of the "value of free choice as a source of
legal rights and liabilities and the consequent increase in importance attached to non-voluntary rights and duties, and finally, the change from contract as an instrument of riskallocation to an instrument of exchange where terms are left "open to continuous adjustment as long as the relationship lasts." Id. at 716-17.
139. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854, 855 n.2
(1978).
140. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 563, 624
(1983).
141. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, supra note 138 (tracing the development of contract law
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drew upon philosophy 142 But by far the greatest number of scholars and commentators explored the relationship of contract law to
1 43
economics.
This outpouring of contract theory has not, however, had a
warm reception in the courts. Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New
York Court of Appeals recently remarked that today most law
review articles "are written by full-time academics. 144 She speculated that "the decrease in judges and practitioners writing for
law reviews may evidence a growing distance between academia
and the rest of us," with academia becoming "increasingly dedicated to abstract, theoretical subjects. 45 Judge Kaye described
as "well-founded" the "concern that academics are writing for
each other.'1 46 As evidence of this statement, Professor Jeffrey
Harrison, after an analysis of fifty-eight books and articles on law
and economics, reported that "approximately half
had not
been cited by a state or federal court," and "[t]he remainder were
cited a total of 77 times," though in "35 instances the citation was
no more than that - a mere notation."'1 47 This is a disappointing
performance for a type of theoretical analysis that had for the
entire decade a pervasive influence in academia, but is consistent
with the overall disinterest of the courts in scholarly efforts.
10. INTERNATIONALIZATION

An observer of the international scene reportedly commented,
"If the world comes to an end, I shall go to the Netherlands.
There every thing happens fifty years later."' 48 This observation
might also apply to the United Nations, or at least to the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
in England beginning with its political, intellectual, and social roots in 1770); M. HORWiTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1960, at 160-210 (1977) (change in
the interpretation of contracts has coincided with the development of a market economy).
142. See, e.g., C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981) (contractual promises are binding as self-imposed moral obligation).
143. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Ist ed. 1972).
144. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC.

313, 320 (1989).
145. Id. at 319, 320.
146. Id. at 320.
147. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A PreliminaryEvaluation of Economic Analysis
in Contract Law, 1988 ANN. SURV. Am.L. 73, 80.
148.

This statement has been attributed, in various forms, to both Heinrich Heine

and Samuel Johnson. S. SCHAMA,THE

EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES: AN INTERPRETATION

OF DUTCH CULTURE IN THE GOLDEN AGE 265

(1988).
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Goods1 49 - a remarkable achievement of the unification of law on
an international plane that came to fruition in the 1980s, fifty
years after work on it first began.
A committee comprised of European scholars commenced
work on the drafting of a uniform law for international sales in
the 1930s, at the behest of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, which operated under the auspices of the
League of Nations. 150 Shortly before the outbreak of the Second
World War, the committee completed a first draft and solicited
comments which it incorporated into a revised draft. A short time
after the conclusion of the War, the Dutch government appointed
another committee to carry on the project. The work completed by
this committee culminated in two companion uniform laws dealing
with the international sale of goods which were approved at a diplomatic conference convened at the Hague in 1964.'51
The United States quickly assembled a delegation to consider
this draft prepared by a group of exclusively European scholars.
The delegation's influence was not sufficient, however, to produce
a final text which satisfied the interests of the United States and
therefore was worthy of ratification, although eight other countries did adopt the new law. 152
Even before the new law had taken effect, efforts were afoot
at the United Nations to produce a revised international sales law
that would be more widely acceptable. In 1966 the United Nations General Assembly established the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"). 153 UNCITRAL has "for its object the promotion of the progressive
harmonization and unification of the law of international
trade."' 54 The thirty-six members of UNCITRAL include com-

149.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE

11 APRIL 1980, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 97/19, U.N. Sales
No. E.81.IV.3 (1981) (documents of the conference and summary records of the Plenary
Meetings and of the meetings of the Main Committees).
150. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 1.9a, at 39.
151. Id. The two uniform laws adopted were the Uniform Law on the International
Sale of Goods (ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF). For the text of the ULF and the ULIS, see J. HONNOLD,
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 531, 539 (1982).
152. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 1.9a, at 39.
153. Id.
154. G.A. Res. 2205, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 99, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967).
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mon law countries and civil law countries, "developing [countries]
as well as industrialized countries, and countries with centrally
planned economies as well as those with free-market
economies."155
In 1969 a fourteen member Working Group on Sales was selected by UNCITRAL to consider changes in the existing law
that would make it "more acceptable to countries of varied legal,
social, and-economic systems." 15 6 In a departure from the previous
draft, the United States actively contributed throughout the drafting process. In 1980, at the start of the decade, the United Nations held another diplomatic conference, this time in Vienna, to
propose a final text of what came to be called "the Vienna Convention." The sixty-two countries involved with the convention dil157
igently worked for five weeks to perfect this final text.
The final product of this fifty year effort consists of eightyeight substantive articles, what American lawyers would call "sections", plus thirteen more articles on effective date, reservations,
and the like.1 58 This Uniform Law on International Sales was to
take effect only after its adoption by ten countries. The ensuing
decade of the 1980s would tell whether the Vienna Convention
would be a practical success or merely an interesting academic
exercise.
In retrospect, the decade has assured the Convention's success. Ratification by the United States, Italy, and the People's Republic of China brought the number to the required ten. Since
January 1, 1988, American exporters and importers have been
subject to the Convention when dealing with parties in other ratifying countries, now numbering over twenty and including Argentina, France, Germany, 5 9 Hungary, Mexico, Switzerland, and
Yugoslavia. When the convention applies, it replaces most of Article 2, the sales article, of the Uniform Commercial Code.

155.
156.
157.

E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 1.9a, at 39.
Id.
Id. at 39-40.

158. For the text of the 1980 Uniform Law for International Sales, see J. HONNOLD,
supra note 151, at 469. Leading commentaries on the Convention include C.

BIANCA

& M.

BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES

CONVENTION (1987); J. HONNOLD, supra note 151. For the legislative history of the Convention, see DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES
(J.Honnold ed. 1989).
159. Both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
ratified the convention, so there is no doubt that the unified Germany abides by the Con-

vention's articles.
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Other examples, on the judicial front, as well as the legislative front, could be given of the increasing internationalization of
contract law, but the success of the Vienna Convention stands as
the most important event of the 1980s in this field.
CONCLUSION

The events chronicled in this essay are not isolated decisions
or statutes, but rather developments on a broader front than a
single case or enactment. They are events with an impact on
academia as well as the practice of law. Although a "top ten" list
cannot encompass all of the evolutions and convolutions of the
past decade, such a list does demonstrate the vitality of contract
law.
At this point the reader may well ask if it would not have
been more rewarding for the author to have predicted the top ten
developments in contract law of the 1990s. Lacking a crystal ball,
the author can only offer to do this in the year 2000 - a propitious time, indeed, for a review not only of the decade but of the
century.

